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Abstract: The representative bureaucracy literature provides a growing body of empirical evidence that a 
representative public workforce enhances the efficacy and legitimacy of public services. However, little attention 
has been paid to the capacity of civil service competitive examinations to give equal opportunity of access to public 
jobs to equally competent citizens. To fill this gap, the authors use French databases to analyze whether competitive 
examinations comprising both written and oral tests ensure equality of treatment for all candidates regardless of gender, 
place of residence, or place of birth. The results challenge the capacity of these examinations to treat candidates equally, 
identifying inequalities in the written tests as well as evaluation biases in the oral tests. However, oral evaluation biases 
tend to offset inequalities in the written tests. Therefore, selection boards take a sort of affirmative action toward the 
sole successful members of groups suffering such inequalities.
Evidence for Practice
• Little is known about the capacity of civil service competitive examinations to provide equal opportunity of 
access to public jobs for equally competent citizens.
• Although written tests preserve candidates’ anonymity, they are not free of adverse impacts against women 
and candidates coming from deprived areas or born abroad.
• Oral tests (which follow the written ones) offer selection boards the opportunity to partially compensate for 
inequalities stemming from written tests, with the objective to better integrate all components of society into 
the civil service.
• The challenge for public managers wanting to promote diversity alongside proficiency is to reduce the scale 
of inequalities in the written tests while preserving the ability to select the best candidates.
Nathalie Greenan
Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Paris
Joseph Lanfranchi
Université Paris 2, Panthéon-Assas
Yannick L’Horty
Université Paris-Est
Mathieu Narcy
Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Paris
Guillaume Pierné
Université d’Angers 
Do Competitive Examinations Promote Diversity in 
Civil Service?
The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that a public workforce should reflect the composition of the general population 
in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, and family social 
class in order to improve the efficacy and legitimacy 
of public services. Mosher (1982) distinguishes two 
types of representation: Passive representation refers to 
the degree to which the members of the bureaucracy 
mirror the society as a whole. Active representation 
assumes that public bureaucrats act, consciously or 
unconsciously, for the interests and desires of those 
who share their demographic and social background. 
Hence, active representation helps policy outcomes 
reflect the interests of all groups represented in 
society, including minorities. In general, the theory 
of representative bureaucracy holds that passive 
representation tends to lead to active representation. 
Nevertheless, recent research has shown that passive 
representation, through its symbolic importance, 
can enhance trust in public organizations and 
produce a greater willingness on the part of citizens 
to coproduce, regardless of bureaucratic actions 
(Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Li 2016; Theobald and 
Haider-Markel 2009).
The aim of this article is to analyze the capacity of 
civil service competitive examinations to provide 
equal opportunity of access to public jobs for 
equally competent citizens and to protect against 
discrimination. In fact, very little attention has been 
paid to the best system of recruitment to achieve 
bureaucratic representation, even though a wide range 
of empirical evidence supports the positive effects of a 
representative public workforce.
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated 
a positive relationship between the proportion of 
minorities in decision- making roles and policy 
outcomes compatible with the interests of those 
minorities, without distinguishing the effects of passive 
and active representations (Bradbury and Kellough 
2011; Nicholson- Crotty et al. 2016). For example, Dee 
(2005) finds that public school students from minority 
groups perform better when they are in classrooms 
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with teachers sharing the same origin. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 
(2006) show a positive relationship between the presence of women 
among police officers and sexual assault reports and arrests. However, 
as these studies typically use organization-level data, it is not possible 
to separate the effects of minority bureaucrats’ behavior (active 
representation) from the effects resulting from the willingness of 
minorities to cooperate and coproduce with bureaucrats coming from 
the same minority group (passive representation).
On one hand, the active representation of bureaucrats needs to be 
assessed at the individual level, which only few studies have done 
so far. One example is the study carried out by Close and Mason 
(2006), who find that both Latino and African American drivers are 
better treated by police officers from those minority groups than by 
white police officers.
On the other hand, a growing empirical literature gives evidence of 
the positive effects of passive representation, especially for street- 
level bureaucrats such as police officers. A study carried out by 
Theobald and Haider-Markel (2009) shows that white and black 
citizens are more likely to perceive police actions as legitimate if 
the citizens share the same demographic characteristics as police 
officers. In the same way, according to Hong (2017), the more 
ethnically representative a police force is, the lower the number of 
black citizens’ complaints against it. More generally, the greater 
willingness of citizens to contribute to the production of public 
services when public organizations are more representative is found 
in many other areas of public action (see, e.g., Guul 2018; Riccucci, 
Van Ryzin, and Li 2016).
Moreover, some studies suggest that positive outcomes not directly 
linked to the primary objective of the public organization can 
still be generated by bureaucratic representation. For example, 
Atkins and Wilkins (2013) find that the presence of minority 
and female teachers helps reduce teen pregnancy rates. Finally, 
representativeness can also improve public organization performance 
by providing more inclusive workplaces (Andrews and Ashworth 
2015) and less discriminatory recruitment procedures (Meier, 
Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999).
To reap the benefits of a representative public workforce while 
recruiting candidates with the skills best suited to public jobs, 
public managers must ensure that recruitment strategies select 
the best candidates regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, 
or socioeconomic background. In developed countries, the 
recruitment of public servants is most often centralized and based 
on performance in open competitive examinations. Historically, 
competitive examinations have been instituted to prevent patronage 
and nepotism. For example, in the United States, the adoption 
of the Pendleton Act of 1883 set up a system of civil service 
competitive examinations so that government jobs are awarded on 
basis of merit rather than political connections. In France, although 
equal access of citizens to public employment on merit alone 
was affirmed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen,1 the general use of open competitive examinations was not 
put into practice until after World War II.
While some studies stress the heavily bureaucratic system of 
competitive examinations that would select candidates based 
on their knowledge or their ability to conform to an academic 
formalism rather than identify the skills suited to a specific 
position (Sundell 2014), this article questions the capacity of 
competitive examinations to treat candidates equally whatever 
their sociodemographic characteristics. More precisely, we seek to 
determine whether the system of competitive examinations avoids 
penalizing some protected groups of candidates on the basis of 
factors that are irrelevant to the jobs for which they apply. In other 
words, we analyze the extent to which this recruitment process 
contributes to the achievement of a representative bureaucracy 
while also allowing the selection of the best available candidates. 
However, it is important to specify that competitive examinations 
free of adverse impacts are a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for obtaining a representative bureaucracy. The skills required for 
success on the tests and the desire to become a civil servant also 
need to be evenly spread out in the population.
In this empirical work, we focus on competitive examinations that 
comprise a first elimination stage consisting of anonymous written 
tests and a second stage consisting of oral tests. First, this allows 
us to assess whether the tests are able to treat candidates equally, 
depending on whether anonymity is guaranteed. Indeed, unlike the 
written tests, the oral tests can give rise to evaluation biases toward 
some groups of candidates. Nevertheless, even though the written 
tests preserve candidates’ anonymity, their object and their content 
may lead to substantial adverse impacts against some protected 
groups of candidates. Second, as the oral tests follow the written 
ones, oral evaluation bias can be evaluated by taking into account 
candidates’ differences in unobservable abilities, as long as the latter 
are constant across the tests. Finally, this two-stage recruitment 
procedure allows us to assess the relationship between evaluation 
biases and inequalities in the written tests. Indeed, selection boards 
may attempt to compensate for inequalities in the written tests to 
balance the objective to recruit the best available candidates with the 
objective to integrate all components of society into the civil service.
The French context is useful for analyzing the capacity of 
competitive examinations to maintain equal opportunity for 
four reasons. First, almost all French civil service competitive 
examinations adopt this two-stage recruitment procedure. Second, 
we were able to get full access to individual, annual, exhaustive data 
for 72 competitive examinations over the period from 2008 to 2015. 
We conducted a separate study for each competitive examination to 
estimate inequalities in the written tests and oral evaluation biases. 
The different effect sizes were then combined into an overall effect 
by carrying out a meta-analysis. Moreover, this large data set allows 
us to estimate the relationship between oral evaluation biases and 
inequalities in the written tests through a meta-regression.
Third, the competitive examinations concern seven ministries 
and thus the recruitment of different types of bureaucrats.2 More 
particularly, we can consider the demographic representativeness 
of street-level bureaucrats such as teachers and police officers. 
Their representativeness is of particular interest because street-level 
bureaucrats typically interact with citizens and therefore serve as 
representatives of the government and its policies.
Fourth, the studies focusing on inequalities of access to public 
jobs are scarce in the French context. To our knowledge, previous 
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studies have focused only on gender inequalities in the competitive 
examinations of two ministries: the Ministry of National Education 
and the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation 
(Bréda and Hillion 2016; Combes, Linnemer, and Visser 2008). In 
this study, we consider not only a much larger sample of competitive 
examinations but also two new group criteria in addition to gender: 
place of birth and place of residence.
Research Hypotheses
Inequalities in Written Tests
At first glance, anonymous written examinations are an effective 
way of combining equality and meritocracy. However, these tests are 
not free of adverse impacts. Bourdieu and Passeron (1964) theorize 
the risk of favoring the selection of individuals who have specific 
cultural and social skills. Hence, the formal equality associated with 
the written tests would not ensure true equality between candidates 
from different sociocultural backgrounds. The possession of cultural 
capital and the internalization of an academic culture would 
facilitate success in the written tests, as upper-class candidates may 
approach academic exercises calmly and self-confidently and have 
a better understanding of the standards on which judgments are 
made.
A vast literature in social psychology has identified the existence of 
adverse impacts against minority groups members associated with 
the implementation of cognitive tests in schools or in the workplace 
(Campbell 1996; Hartigan and Wigdor 1989). For example, the 
General Aptitude Test Battery, which has been widely used as a 
measure of cognitive ability in employment selection, provides 
strong adverse impacts against African Americans (Hartigan and 
Wigdor 1989). Consequently, when cognitive ability tests are used 
in recruitment decisions, differences in test scores between minority 
and majority groups invariably lead to lower job selection rates for 
minority groups, feeding debates about affirmative action. The 
causes of these adverse impacts are numerous and partly related 
to the design of the tests, including their measurement methods, 
cultural standards of reference, and choice of selection criteria 
(Hough, Oswald, and Ployhart 2001). Written tests in French 
competitive examinations rely more on cognitive skills than those 
in the United States, where the tests are more work related—for 
instance, using job simulated exercises that minimize adverse 
impacts against protected groups.
Finally, limitations associated with examination logistics 
(examinations held in central cities for people living in remote 
locations or overseas) and more generally with their costs for 
candidates add up with those associated with the content of the 
written tests. Candidates who can rely on their family or social 
networks to organize the time they need to prepare for competitive 
examinations will benefit. The cost of the competitive examination 
is also psychological. Indeed, candidates may experience 
competition differently. Experimental tests have shown that 
women tend to refuse competitive mechanisms more often than 
men and are less effective in such contexts (Datta Gupta, Poulsen, 
and Villeval 2013; Ors, Palomino, and Peyrache 2013). These 
observations lead us to the first hypothesis in our study:
Hypothesis 1: Written tests are not free of adverse impacts 
against some groups of candidates.
Sources of Evaluation Biases in Oral Tests
In addition to the possibility of inequalities in the written tests, 
the non-anonymous oral test stage may give rise to differences in 
evaluation between candidates once their characteristics become 
observable. Indeed, lifting anonymity may generate discriminatory 
evaluation biases in the form of an advantage given to a specific 
group of candidates independently of their true ability. An 
evaluation bias can be interpreted as positive discrimination when  
it favors an allegedly unfairly treated group.
Economic theory gives two main explanations for discriminatory 
behaviors. The taste-based discrimination theory (Becker 1957) 
justifies discriminatory behavior by the aversion of decision makers 
to members of particular groups. As competitive examinations 
constitute an imperfect information framework, statistical 
discrimination theory (Arrow 1973) suggests that members 
of selection boards may also have developed beliefs about the 
distribution of unobservable determinants of the performance of 
members of certain groups.
Theories from psychology discuss alternative sources for 
discriminatory evaluation biases. The theory of in-group favoritism 
states that evaluators may be tempted to favor members of their 
own group (Anderson, Fryer, and Holt 2006). Other forms of 
favoritism might also occur, directly helping a candidate belonging 
to a professional or family network or favoring those belonging 
to a group that suffered from previous penalization in order to 
compensate for those inequalities.
Several examples from the literature on academic evaluations 
and on recruitment illustrate these forms of discriminatory 
evaluation biases. For instance, a change in the audition procedures 
for American symphony orchestras’ entrance examinations 
demonstrated the extent of the discrimination against female 
candidates (Goldin and Rouse 2000). The introduction of blind 
auditions explains a substantial part of the increase in the number 
of female instrumentalists recruited in the 1970s and 1980s. By 
comparing classroom evaluations against an anonymous national 
examination, Lavy (2008) shows that in Israeli high schools, boys 
suffer from the bias of their teachers. A controlled experiment 
carried out in Germany shows that teachers grade the papers signed 
by people with surnames of Turkish origin lower than papers signed 
by people with surnames of German origin (Sprietsma 2013).
The literature on academic evaluations also shows that teachers 
sometimes give lower grades to pupils when they belong to the same 
group. In some subjects, Norwegian female high school students 
achieve their best results under the supervision of male teachers, but 
not in mathematics (Falch and Naper 2013). Hanna and Linden 
(2012) show that the lower the caste they belong to, the less well 
Indian students are rated, with such evaluation bias coming more 
likely from lower-caste teachers.
Studies of civil service competitive examinations have demonstrated 
the existence of evaluation biases. Some studies exhibit evaluation 
biases against women. For example, in the context of recruitment 
for the Spanish Ministry of Justice between 1987 and 2007, Bagues 
and Esteve-Volart (2010) show that selection boards are less likely to 
recruit female candidates when they are composed of more women. 
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The same type of result was found by Bagues, Labini, and Zinovyeva 
(2017), who analyze how the gender composition of scientific 
committees affects the chances of success of female and male 
candidates in competitive examinations to become full and associate 
professors in Italy and Spain. The authors provide two interpretations 
of this evidence. First, female evaluators are not statistically more 
likely to vote in favor of female candidates than male evaluators. 
Second, male evaluators become less favorable toward female 
candidates when women are present on the committee.
There is also empirical evidence of evaluation biases in favor of 
candidates according to their social background. Bagues and 
Esteve-Volart (2008) observe a strong hereditary component in 
the recruitment of Spanish top civil servants, partly because of 
“favoritism based on kinship” in oral tests. Combes, Linnemer, and 
Visser (2008) analyze competitive examinations from 1984 to 2003 
for the recruitment of French university professors in economics. 
They show that network effects between the selection board and the 
candidates favor the latter, to the extent of compensating in some 
cases for a substantially lower publication record.
Finally, considering that the diversity of the population in the 
civil service is of major importance in exercising democratic rule, 
some selection boards may advantage groups of candidates when 
they are underrepresented in public employment. In the French 
context, two studies suggest that such compensation strategies 
occur. Bréda and Ly (2015) analyze the entrance examinations 
at the École Normale Supérieure,3 and Bréda and Hillion (2016) 
the competitive examinations for the recruitment of primary and 
secondary school teachers. They show that once aware of candidates’ 
identities, selection boards favor female candidates in oral tests in 
fields in which women are in a minority. Selection boards thus seem 
to contribute to rebalancing gender representation in these sectors. 
This literature leads us to formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Competitive examinations are not free of 
evaluation biases because of the inclusion of non-anonymous 
oral tests.
Sources of the Relationship between Inequalities in Written 
Tests and Evaluation Biases
Evaluation biases may express selection boards’ initial preferences 
or beliefs with respect to some groups of candidates. They may 
also relate to observed inequalities in the written tests. Indeed, the 
two-stage design of competitive examinations allows for such a 
relationship. While in the oral test stage of the examination, the 
selection board members ignore the grades obtained individually 
by candidates in the written stage, they may have access to 
official information about average group performance.4 Further, 
information about performance in the written tests of some groups 
of candidates can be inferred from their relative participation in 
the oral tests. Finally, during its final deliberations, when the list of 
successful candidates is established and all of their written and oral 
grades are available, the selection board can still discuss and revise at 
the margin the grades of the oral stage.
The theory of representative bureaucracy gives efficiency grounds to 
the behavior of selection boards that pursue the objective to better 
represent society in the civil service by compensating in the oral 
tests for the adverse impacts observed in the written tests. Hence, 
selection boards, aware of the existence of inequalities in the written 
tests, may choose to rebalance the outcomes of groups of candidates 
by biasing the grades given in the oral tests in the opposite direction. 
As individuals who are unsuccessful in the written tests do not 
proceed to the oral tests, this bias offsets inequalities at the group 
level only. In this case, the relationship between inequalities in the 
written tests and evaluation biases will be negative.
While positive discrimination practices are contrary to the principle 
of equality, Levade (2004) shows that French law does include 
differentiations that can be linked to positive discrimination. For 
example, the French Defender of Rights indicates that it is “possible 
for an employer, when selecting candidates, to give a compensatory 
advantage to people belonging to an objectively disadvantaged 
group because of a prohibited criterion.” In this case, the employer 
must use such advantage to “decide between candidates whose skills 
have been judged as equal” (Défenseur des droits and CNIL 2012, 
19). This new vision of the principle of equality under French law 
could provide the basis for compensatory practices by selection 
boards in the oral tests. Moreover, Holzer and Neumark (2000) 
show that affirmative action programs encourage the integration of 
minorities with relatively little efficiency loss. These explanations 
justify the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Selection boards’ evaluation biases may 
compensate for the inequalities in the written tests and thereby 
contribute to passive representation in the bureaucracy.
Competitive Examination Data and Econometric 
Methodology
To test these hypotheses, we need a data set on competitive 
examinations that fulfills three conditions. First, it must relate 
to competitive examinations that take place in two stages, with 
candidate anonymity lifted between the two stages. This setting 
offers a natural experiment that allows us to approach evaluation 
biases through the comparison of the anonymous and non- 
anonymous stages. Second, it must give information about not only 
the success or failure of candidates at each stage of the competitive 
examination but also the grades obtained. Third, the data should 
describe relevant sociodemographic characteristics of the candidates, 
permitting the analysis of inequality of access, all else being equal.
We gathered data from the French context because we were able to get 
full access to individual information for all candidates, covering a large 
set of competitive examinations.5 Indeed, we processed data for 72 
external state civil service competitive examinations for all qualification 
categories (A, B, and C)6 and for seven ministries: Agriculture; 
Economy and Finance; Foreign Affairs; Higher Education, Research, 
and Innovation; Interior; Labor; and National Education. In all, 58 
percent of the candidates applied for positions as secondary school 
teachers or police officers. Since the seminal work of Lipsky (1980), 
it is well known that these street-levels bureaucrats act as quasi policy 
makers in their area of duty. Therefore, the ability of recruitment 
strategies to achieve representativeness in these professions is essential.
For most examinations, we have yearly data relating to variable 
periods of observation, generally starting in the late 2000s and 
ending in 2014 or 2015. Columns 1 and 2 in table 1 list the 
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number of competitive examinations and periods of observation 
covered in each ministry. Within each competitive examination, 
a competitive session is a set of written and oral tests designed to 
select a given number of candidates. Most of the time, sessions are 
organized on a yearly basis, but the periodicity also varies with the 
number of vacant positions. Column 3 in table 1 reports for each 
examination in each ministry the number of competitive sessions for 
which we estimate the inequalities and evaluation biases associated 
with each criterion.7 The last column presents the number of 
candidates who took part in all the written tests. In total, more 
than half a million candidates took part in all the written tests, 
representing almost 50 percent of the recruitment of civil servants 
during this period.
We observe three applicant characteristics—gender, place of 
birth, and place of residence—among the list of 25 criteria of 
discrimination prohibited under French law. We consider three 
places of residence: Paris, municipalities with more than 25 percent 
of the population living in sensitive urban zones (zone urbaine 
sensible or ZUS),8 and other municipalities. For place of birth, we 
distinguish candidates according to whether they were or were 
not born in metropolitan France.9 Most of the empirical studies 
devoted to the evaluation of passive representation in Anglo-Saxon 
countries are concerned with gender, race, and ethnicity criteria. 
However, under French law, the use of racial and ethnic statistics is 
forbidden. Nevertheless, places of residence and place of birth reflect 
the unequal situations of applicants in terms of their economic 
conditions, social background, and ethnic origin.
The median household disposable income is more than 25 percent 
higher in Paris than in the country as a whole. In addition, the 
proportion of executives is two and a half times larger. On the 
other hand, ZUS residents have experienced degraded economic 
conditions. In these areas, the poverty rate is 38.4 percent, 
compared with 13.9 percent for the whole of France.10 The ZUS 
areas are also characterized by high concentrations of certain 
minorities. Among young people recently out of the education 
system, 29 percent of those of North African origin and 40 
percent of those of sub-Saharan African origin live in ZUS areas, 
compared with 4 percent of young people of French origin.11 
Finally, several studies suggest that people living in these areas suffer 
from discrimination in the labor market, resulting in less access to 
employment (Beffy, Coudin, and Rathelot 2014; Bunel, L’Horty, 
and Petit 2016) and lower wage levels (Couppié, Giret, and Moullet 
2010).
The effect of place of birth reflects first of all the influence of 
immigration status, since more than three-quarters of individuals 
born outside France are immigrants. Some immigrants face 
economic and social difficulties (mastery of the French language, 
schooling, unemployment, etc.). Then, among the populations 
born outside metropolitan France are those from the overseas 
departments and territories, who may suffer from discrimination 
based on their skin color.
Information about gender and place of residence is available in the 
seven ministries, but information about place of birth is absent in 
all competitive examinations from three ministries (Agriculture; 
National Education; and Higher Education, Research, and 
Innovation) and in some from the Ministry of Economy.12
Tables A1 and A2 in the Supporting Information online show 
that the average success rates in both the written and oral tests 
differ significantly by gender, place of residence, and place of birth 
of the candidates. When considering all ministries together, two 
categories of candidates are less successful in both the written and 
oral tests: candidates born outside metropolitan France and ZUS 
residents. The lesser success of candidates born outside metropolitan 
France in the written and oral tests is observed in all ministries for 
which this criterion is available. The differences in success rates 
in the written tests according to place of residence differ little 
from one ministry to another. In fact, Parisian candidates perform 
significantly better in all the ministries except Economy, and ZUS 
candidates are less successful in written tests than candidates living 
Table 1 Description of the Meta-Analysis Data Set
Ministry
Number of Competitive 
Examinations
Period of 
Observation
Number of 
Competitive Sessions
Number of Estimations Number of 
CandidatesGender Place of Residence Place of Birth
Economy
 G1 6 2007–2015 2 12 12 12 19,695
 G2 4 2007–2015 2 8 8 — 7,468
 G3 1 2007–2015 13 13 13 13 21,083
 G4 1 2007–2016 15 15 15 15 30,149
 Total 12 — 32 48 48 40 78,395
Agriculture 3 2000–2016 2 6 6 — 25,381
Foreign Affairs 3 2010–2015 2 6 6 6 13,390
Interior
 G1 1 2011–2014 2 2 2 2 1,636
 G2 2 2011–2014 5 10 10 10 50,921
 Total 3 — 7 12 12 12 52,557
Labor 2 2009–2015 2 4 4 4 9,123
National Education 45 2008–2015 8 360 360 — 355,745
Higher Education, Research, and Innovation 4 2009–2015 2 8 8 — 29,215
Total 72 — 55 444 444 62 563,806
Notes: The number of competitive sessions corresponds to the years or groups of years for which we estimated the effect of each criterion. In the Ministries of Interior 
and Economy, we divide the competitive examinations into two and four groups, respectively, because they differ in the number of competitive sessions and/or the 
availability of some membership criteria. The number of competitive sessions exceeds the total number of years when several sessions are organized within the same 
year (G2, police officers) or, in the case of competition merger, in the period preceding the merger (G3, public finance controller, and G4, public finance inspector). The 
number of candidates refers to those who completed all the written tests.
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in other municipalities in four ministries out of seven (Economy, 
Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and National Education) but more 
successful in the Ministry of Interior. The differences in oral test 
success rates for these candidates are more pronounced. There is no 
significant difference in success rates according to place of residence 
in the Ministries of Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Labor. Parisian 
candidates perform better in oral tests in the Ministries of Economy 
and National Education, while ZUS candidates underperform in 
the Ministries of Interior and National Education and fare better in 
the Ministry of Higher Education, Research, and Innovation.
Results for gender are more complex. If women are doing better 
overall than men in both the written and oral tests, it is far from 
being a common finding in all ministries. Female candidates have 
higher success rates in written tests than males in the Ministries 
of Economy; Interior; and Higher Education, Research, and 
Innovation and lower ones in the ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Labor, and, to a lesser extent, National Education. Regarding 
significant differences in oral tests success rates, women are more 
likely to succeed in the Ministry of National Education and less so 
in the Ministry of Interior.
Differences in success rates between categories of candidates logically 
lead to a change in the sociodemographic composition of the pool of 
candidates at each stage of the competitive examination (see table A3 in 
the Supporting Information online). The most pronounced distortion 
concerns the proportion of candidates born outside metropolitan 
France, since they are only 9.4 percent among the successful candidates 
in the examination, whereas they account for 17.9 percent among the 
candidates who completed all the written tests. The same logic applies 
within each of the four ministries where this criterion is available. 
Furthermore, for each criterion, the written tests lead to a greater 
alteration in the composition of the pool of applicants than the oral tests.
These success rates do not necessarily reflect unequal treatment of 
candidates in the examinations. To assess the ability of competitive 
examination to treat candidates equally, it is necessary to neutralize the 
differences in the candidates’ characteristics that may influence their 
performance throughout the competitive examinations. Our data set 
provides information about three sets of such candidates’ traits. First, 
their level of education and age reflect the general human capital they 
have accumulated. We also observe occupational status at the date 
of the examination (inactive, unemployed, private worker, public 
servant),13 signaling the possible acquisition of the skills required for 
the job. Finally, the likely influence of household demands on the level 
of effort devoted to preparation for the examination is approximated 
by marital status and number of children.
Whereas age and educational level are known in all competitive 
examinations, the number of children and marital status are 
present only for the competitive examinations of the Ministries 
of Interior and Labor and for some of the examinations of the 
Ministry of Economy. Finally, occupational status is available only 
for the competitive examinations of the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, National Education; and Higher Education, Research, and 
Innovation.
To test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, we need to determine 
whether gender, place of residence, and place of birth affect the 
candidates’ probability of success in the written test stage and the 
extent of evaluation biases in the oral test stage while controlling 
for all observable sources of performance. So, we will bring to light 
whether written and oral tests are likely to select candidates who are 
representative of the “competent” subpopulation that is composed 
of equally able candidates in terms of those observable sources 
of performance. The heterogeneity of the information available 
between competitive examinations suggests that it is preferable 
to run a specific regression within each of the 72 competitive 
examinations. Performing a single regression pooling all the 
candidates from all the competitive examinations would restrain 
the control variables to those available in all examinations, leading 
to less control over the heterogeneity of performance between the 
candidates.
In addition, when a given candidate’s characteristic is available 
in several competitive examinations, it may be coded differently 
because each ministry decided on coding practices independently 
from one another. This is a particular concern for level of education 
and occupational status.
To test hypothesis 1, for each of the 72 competitive examinations, 
we estimate a probit model explaining the probability of passing 
among the candidates who completed all the written tests, 
controlling for all of their available characteristics. Thus, candidate 
i succeeds in the written test if his or her average grade Ni
W  exceeds 
the minimum grade required by the selection board N W , which is 
unobservable by the candidates. Then we denote Y, the observed 
binary variable corresponding to whether the candidate is successful 
or not in the written tests:
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We model the probability of success in written test as follows:
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where Ci is a vector of the three group criteria and Xi is a vector 
including all control variables available in each competitive 
examination. Finally, ei
W  is the error term following standard normal 
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ.To test 
hypothesis 2, we have to identify the presence of discriminatory 
evaluation biases in the oral test stage. For that purpose, we perform 
a double difference estimation (see, e.g., Bréda and Ly 2015). 
Simply evaluating the influence of each criterion on the average 
grade obtained in the oral test stage is unsatisfactory. Indeed, the 
average grade obtained by candidate i in the oral tests Ni
O depends 
on his or her observed characteristics (Xi) but also on an unobserved 
ability to perform in oral tests (qi
O). We can model this grade as 
follows, considering for the sake of simplicity a single criterion, C1i:
   N C Xi
O O O
i
O
i i
O
i
O= + + + +a b g q e1 1   (3)
The vector Xi includes the same control variables as in the probit 
models. If qi
O is correlated with the criterion C1i, then b1
O
 does not 
only reflect a discriminatory evaluation bias by the selection board 
toward candidates belonging to C1i. To control for this potential 
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correlation, we need to find a way to take into account this 
unobserved ability. It may be linked to intrinsic characteristics of the 
candidate such as the capacity to work hard or the ability to manage 
emotions, but it may also depend on the logistics of the entrance 
examination (e.g., the distance between the candidate’s home and 
the entrance examination venue). These unobserved characteristics 
are likely to influence success in both the written and oral tests. 
Hence, we assume that the unobserved ability to perform in oral 
tests qi
O is correlated with the unobserved ability to perform in the 
written tests (qi
W ) and includes a component that is specific to oral 
tests (ωi):
    q rq wi
O
i
W
i= +   (4)
Moreover, we can model the written grade as follows:
 N C Xi
W W W
i
W
i i
W
i
W= + + + +a b g q e1 1   (5)
It is then possible to estimate the influence of the membership 
criterion, not on the average grade obtained in the oral test but on 
the difference between this grade and the average grade obtained in 
the written test. We can model it as follows:
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Estimating this grade differential makes it possible to eliminate 
the effect of the unobserved ability of the candidates affecting 
both the average grades obtained in the written and oral tests 
when it is valued in a similar way in the two types of tests (ρ = 1). 
The coefficient b b1 1
O W-( )  then corresponds to a selection board 
discriminatory evaluation bias toward candidates belonging to C1i, 
provided that there are no candidates’ aptitudes specifically valued 
in oral tests (ωi = 0) or, more realistically, that these aptitudes are not 
correlated with group criterion C1i. This evaluation bias corresponds 
to the difference in the points obtained between the written and 
oral tests between the population belonging to the criterion C1i and 
the reference population. For example, if the estimated coefficient 
associated with being a woman is positive, that means that female 
candidates gain (or lose) relatively more (or fewer) points between 
the written and oral tests than males do.
We organize our econometric strategy in three phases.
Phase 1. We perform 72 independent empirical analyses, each 
corresponding to a given competitive examination. In every model, 
we interact our three group criteria with dummies for successive 
competitive sessions. Hence, we obtain the estimated effects of each 
criterion on the probability of passing the written test stage and on 
the difference in average grade between the written and oral tests 
for each competitive session. We interpret the former as a measure 
of inequality in the written test stage and the latter as a measure of 
evaluation bias in the oral test stage.
To the extent that we compare individuals who took part in 
different competitive sessions as well as grades obtained at different 
stages, it is possible that comparability problems arise. This will be 
the case, for example, if the evaluators tended to score candidates in 
a much more severe and/or homogeneous manner in some sessions 
compared with others. To solve this problem, we have standardized 
the average grades obtained in the written and oral tests for each 
competitive session and examination specialty. This standardization 
involves converting the average scores obtained by the candidates 
in such a way that each distribution has a zero mean and a unitary 
standard deviation. It guarantees comparability across time and 
between examination specialties.
Phase 2. After phase 1, we have 444 estimated effects of gender 
and place of residence and 62 effects of place of birth (see column 
4 of table 1) on the probability of passing the written tests and 
on the difference in average grade between the written and oral 
tests. To assess the validity of hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, we 
must aggregate these effects to improve the reliability of the true 
effect size. For that purpose, we use a meta-analysis in which 
each competitive session is treated as a specific experiment. We 
assume that each estimated effect follows a normal distribution 
with a mean equal to the true effect size and a variance equal to 
the sum of the variance of this effect size within and between the 
competitive sessions. Our estimated effects are therefore sampled 
from a distribution of effects in the different sessions with a nonzero 
between-sessions variance. This random-effects meta-analysis 
computes the aggregate effect size as a weighted mean incorporating 
an estimate of the between-sessions variance into each session 
weight, equal to the inverse of the sum of the variance of this effect 
size within and between the sessions. We use the residual maximum 
likelihood method to estimate the latter (Patterson and Thompson 
1971).
We obtain an aggregate effect size for each criterion. To understand 
how heterogeneous those effect sizes are according to the 
characteristics of competitive sessions, we also run meta-regression 
models controlling for the organizing ministry, the qualification 
level category, and the log number of recruits. We estimate a 
random-effects linear regression model for each criterion with as 
many observations as the number of competitive sessions.14
Phase 3. To test the validity of hypothesis 3, we perform a meta- 
regression model for each criterion, explaining the magnitude of the 
evaluation bias in the oral test stage by the extent of the inequality 
of success in the written test stage. We run these regressions with 
and without controls for the characteristics of the competitive 
sessions.
Results
Inequalities in the Written Test Stage
The top of table 2 presents the aggregate effect size of each criterion 
on the inequality of success in the written tests, obtained from the 
meta-analysis. All things being equal, the three criteria are associated 
with significant inequalities of success in the written test stage. 
Consequently, anonymity in written tests does not guarantee an equal 
probability of success between the different groups of candidates. 
Thus, the results confirm hypothesis 1. The written test design has 
adverse impacts on candidates born outside metropolitan France, 
non-Parisian candidates—particularly those living in municipalities 
with large ZUS—and, to a lesser extent, female candidates.
More precisely, candidates born outside metropolitan France are the 
most disadvantaged: their probability of succeeding in the written 
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test stage is 8.6 percentage points lower that that of candidates born 
in metropolitan France. According to table A4 in the Supporting 
Information online, they are penalized in 88.71 percent of the 
competitive sessions, and they never benefit from an advantage.
Parisian candidates benefit from a probability of success in the 
written tests that is 6.2 percentage points higher than candidates 
living outside Paris in a municipality with no or small ZUS. They 
have greater chances of success in one competitive session out 
of three. Nearly half of the Parisian candidates participated in 
competitive sessions in which they had an advantage in the written 
tests. Conversely, the candidates living in municipalities with large 
ZUS suffer from a disadvantage of 1.2 percentage points, and they 
are penalized in 10 percent of the competitive sessions.
Finally, the chances of success in the written tests are smaller for 
women (−0.9 percentage points) than for men. Nevertheless, 
table A4 in the Supporting Information online reveals that 
although women are penalized in more than one-fifth of the 
sessions, they still perform better than men in 12.9 percent of those 
sessions. Thus, as noted in the descriptive statistics, there is more 
heterogeneity in effects for gender than for other criteria.
The bottom part of table 2 analyzes some likely sources of the 
heterogeneity in effect size between competitive sessions. The log 
number of recruits does not explain differences in inequalities of 
success in the written tests, except for candidates born outside 
metropolitan France, whose disadvantage in the written tests is 
larger when the examination offers more positions. The magnitude 
of the advantage in the written tests for Parisian candidates is larger 
in competitive examinations for high-qualification positions (A 
category). Inequality of success in the written tests also varies with 
the recruiting ministries for place of residence and for gender. 
Parisian candidates benefit from a lower advantage in the Ministries 
of Economy and Agriculture, while the penalty experienced by ZUS 
residents in the written tests is lower in the Ministries of Interior; 
Labor; and Higher Education, Research, and Innovation. Finally, 
the advantage of male candidates is greater in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs than in any other ministry.
The systematic presence of adverse impacts for different groups 
of candidates, as well as their considerable heterogeneity among 
ministries, suggests that it would be illuminating to analyze to what 
extent it could be explained by the variability in the design of the 
written tests.
Evaluation Biases in the Oral Test Stage
The results presented in table 3 and in table A5 in the Supporting 
Information globally corroborate hypothesis 2. Indeed, table A5 
reveals that, except for ZUS residents, candidates experience 
significant evaluation biases in more than one-fifth of competitive 
sessions. However, the aggregate effect size of each criterion on the 
evaluation biases in the oral test stage presented at the top of table 3 
is significant only for women and candidates living in municipalities 
with large ZUS.
More precisely, on average, selection boards tend to favor the 
former and penalize the latter. Indeed, competitive sessions in 
which women enjoy a favorable evaluation bias are 1.8 times more 
frequent than those in which the evaluation bias is unfavorable. 
Conversely, the sessions in which candidates living in municipalities 
with large ZUS suffer from a negative evaluation bias are 1.6 times 
more frequent than those in which they benefit from a positive bias.
Although it is not significant, the average evaluation bias faced by 
candidates born outside metropolitan France is positive, and it is the 
Table 2  Inequalities of Success in the Written Tests: Overall Effect and Analysis of Heterogeneity
Woman
Place of Residence
Born Outside Metropolitan FranceParis Resident ZUS Resident
Aggregate effect size
−0.009*** (2.91) 0.062*** (15.19) −0.012*** (5.92) −0.086*** (12.83)
Number of observations 442 431 439 62
Sources of heterogeneity
Constant −0.036* (1.88) −0.028 (1.51) −0.027** (2.15) −0.021 (0.65)
Ministry
 Economy Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 Agriculture 0.006 (0.22) 0.054 (1.59) 0.019 (1.59) —
 Foreign Affairs −0.081*** (3.28) 0.069*** (3.26) 0.004 (0.31) 0.019 (0.84)
 Interior 0.018 (0.93) 0.094*** (4.86) 0.015* (1.87) −0.001 (0.08)
 Labor −0.014 (0.49) 0.116*** (4.42) 0.022* (1.86) −0.004 (0.16)
 National Education 0.005 (0.38) 0.094*** (8.11) −0.005 (0.72) —
 Higher Education 0.025 (1.14) 0.047** (2.49) 0.022** (2.49) —
Category
 B/C Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 A 0.007 (0.54) 0.023** (1.82) 0.010 (1.52) 0.003 (0.22)
Log number of recruits 0.003 (1.07) −0.001 (0.27) 0.001 (0.50) −0.015** (2.49)
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.502 0.303 0.194
Note: Absolute t-values are in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1% level;
**at the 5% level;
*at the 10% level.
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criterion with the highest share of sessions with positive evaluation 
bias (in one session out of five). In addition, being Parisian gives rise 
to evaluation bias in more than one-fifth of competitive sessions. 
Nevertheless, these biases are sometimes negative and sometimes 
positive, which explains why the aggregate effect size is not significant.
The bottom of table 3 displays the sources of heterogeneity in 
evaluation biases. The magnitude of evaluation biases differs 
slightly from one ministry to another for gender and for the place 
of residence, whereas it does not depend on the recruiting ministry 
for place of birth. It is within the Ministry of Labor that women 
are the least likely to benefit from a favorable evaluation bias. If we 
refer to table A5 in the Supporting Information, half of the sessions 
in this ministry exhibit a disadvantage for female candidates. The 
only ministry in which Parisians suffer from a significant negative 
evaluation bias is the Ministry of Agriculture. Indeed, according to 
table A5, it is the only ministry characterized by no evaluation bias 
in their favor, whereas in half of the sessions, these biases are to their 
disadvantage. ZUS residents are more likely to suffer from negative 
evaluation biases in the Ministry of National Education compared 
with other ministries.
Evaluation biases are less favorable for women in high-qualification 
competitive exams (A category) than in lower-qualification ones (B 
and C categories). In contrast, evaluation biases are more favorable 
for candidates living in municipalities with large ZUS in high- 
qualification examinations and in examinations for which the 
number of offered positions is high.
At this stage of the analysis, two results stand out. On the one hand, 
there are very high inequalities of success in the written tests. On 
the other hand, the oral tests are far from being free of evaluation 
biases. A question now arises: do evaluation biases exist to partially 
offset inequalities of success in the written tests? In other words, do 
selection boards tend to overevaluate (resp. underevaluate) groups 
of candidates who have been less (resp. more) successful in the 
written tests to make the French civil service more representative? It 
is relevant to emphasize that the fact of not observing a significant 
evaluation bias in favor of a given group of candidates is not 
enough to discard the compensating behavior of selection boards 
toward this group. Indeed, it is sufficient that the evaluation biases 
giving advantage (resp. disadvantage) to a group of candidates are 
significantly more frequent when this group is less (resp. more) 
successful in the written tests. To investigate the likelihood of a 
compensation mechanism in oral test grades, we need to estimate 
the relationship between inequalities in the written tests and 
evaluation biases in the oral tests.
Relationship between Inequalities in Written Tests and 
Evaluation Biases
Table 4 gives, for each criterion, the results of the meta-regressions 
that relate the extent of inequalities of success in the written tests 
with the magnitude of evaluation biases, with and without controls 
for the characteristics of the competitive sessions.
The results validate hypothesis 3 for gender and place of birth. The 
more male candidates are successful in the written tests compared 
with women, the more women candidates benefit from evaluation 
biases to their advantage in the oral tests, and vice versa. The same 
type of compensation mechanism seems to prevail for candidates 
born outside metropolitan France. However, the coefficient 
associated with our measure of inequality of success in the written 
tests becomes nonsignificant when the characteristics of the 
competitive sessions are taken into account. In fact, supplementary 
Table 3  Evaluation Bias in the Oral Tests: Overall Effect and Analysis of Heterogeneity
Woman
Place of Residence Born Outside Metropolitan 
FranceParis Resident ZUS Resident
Aggregate size effect
0.044*** (4.37) −0.0035 (0.23) −0.022* (1.85) 0.025 (0.66)
Number of observations 442 431 439 62
Sources of heterogeneity
Constant 0.097 (1.51) 0.003 (0.01) −0.118* (1.65) −0.190 (1.00)
Ministry
 Economy Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 Agriculture 0.133 (1.35) −0.731*** (5.40) −0.159 (1.43) —
 Foreign Affairs 0.043 (0.46) 0.065 (0.57) 0.092 (0.85) −0.071 (0.44)
 Interior −0.031 (0.45) 0.114 (1.17) 0.097 (1.33) −0.057 (0.57)
 Labor −0.216** (2.11) 0.132 (0.91) 0.018 (0.15) −0.081 (0.53)
 National Education 0.015 (0.37) −0.092 (1.64) −0.142*** (2.94) —
 Higher Education −0.091 (1.14) −0.043 (0.39) 0.083 (0.81) —
Category
 B/C Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 A −0.128*** (2.62) 0.106 (1.59) 0.112** (2.05) −0.081 (0.53)
Log number of recruits 0.010 (0.96) −0.004 (0.26) 0.020* (1.67) 0.058 (1.64)
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.142 0.052 0.031
Note: Absolute t-values are in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1% level;
**at the 5% level;
*at the 10% level.
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investigation reveals that the compensation phenomenon favoring 
candidates born outside metropolitan France takes place more 
often in the Ministry of Labor and in the largest competitive 
examinations.
Hence, selection boards seem to take into account the gender of 
the candidates and, to a lesser extent, their place of birth in order to 
offset the inequalities observed in the written tests during the oral 
tests. This behavior is aimed at improving the representativeness of 
the civil service in terms of gender and place of birth. On the other 
hand, there is no relationship between inequalities in the written 
tests and oral evaluation biases concerning place of residence. 
Therefore, the competitive examinations in which ZUS candidates 
are disadvantaged in the oral tests are not the same as those in which 
they suffer from the lowest probability of success in the written tests.
Discussion
According to the “four-fifths rule,” which is the most common 
measure of adverse impact used in the United States, differences 
in average success rates in the written tests of French civil service 
competitive examinations show evidence of adverse impacts. This 
rule, codified in the 1978 Federal Uniform Guidelines on Employee 
Selection Procedures, states that a selection rate for a given group 
that is less than 80 percent of that of the highest-scoring group may 
be regarded as adverse impact. According to this rule, table A1 in 
the Supporting Information reveals that the written tests provide 
adverse impacts against candidates born outside metropolitan 
France in all ministries and against non-Parisian candidates with the 
exception of the Ministries of Economy and National Education. 
These tests also generate adverse impacts against women, but only 
in the Ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Affairs.
As ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court, the important question 
that arises is, are the inequalities recorded in the written tests 
“reasonably related” to the duties performed in the jobs? Many 
reasons lead us to think that the answer is negative. First, adverse 
impacts do not disappear when the differences in the candidates’ 
characteristics that may influence their performance in written tests 
are neutralized. Second, the differences in success rates according 
to place of birth and place of residence are of such magnitude that 
one may legitimately believe that some of the differences are based 
on selection criteria irrelevant to the job. Third, a lower mastery 
of the French language (relevant criterion for public employment) 
cannot fully explain the differences in success rates according to 
place of birth. Indeed, 63.4 percent of the candidates born outside 
metropolitan France come from the French overseas departments 
and territories where French is the official language. Moreover, 
these candidates have a significant lower success rate on the written 
tests than immigrant candidates: 13.2 percent versus 17.1 percent 
(26 percent for candidates born in metropolitan France). Fourth, 
although inequalities of success in the written tests between women 
and men are smaller, we carried out a complementary analysis 
suggesting that they are essentially based on irrelevant criteria 
for public employment. To do this, we considered competitive 
examinations to become a teacher, and more particularly the 
Agrégation examination. Some of the candidates for the Agrégation 
examination are already teachers who have passed successfully the 
CAPES competitive examination. Thus, we know that they possess 
the required skills to be a teacher as well as some professional 
experience. Agrégation provides higher status with higher pay 
and shorter working hours. It also offers the opportunity to teach 
in higher education institutions. When we compare the effect of 
gender on the probability of success in the written tests, depending 
Table 4  Results of Meta-Regression: Effect of Inequalities of Success in the Written Tests on Evaluation Biases in the Oral Tests
Woman
Place of Residence Born Outside Metropolitan 
FranceParis Resident ZUS Resident
Without independent variables
Constant 0.037*** (3.82) −0.002 (0.08) −0.019 (1.60) −0.130* (1.72)
Inequality of success −0.834*** (5.71) −0.026 (0.15) 0.213 (1.02) −1.636** (2.35)
Adjusted R2 0.14 −0.003 −0.003 0.09
With independent variables
Constant 0.067 (1.09) 0.001 (0.01) −0.112 (1.57) −0.259 (1.35)
Inequality of success −0.858*** (5.72) −0.079 (0.42) 0.221 (1.06) −1.256 (1.66)
Ministry
 Economy Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 Agriculture 0.122 (1.30) −0.731*** (5.40) −0.166 (1.49) —
 Foreign Affairs −0.077 (0.83) 0.069 (0.61) 0.088 (0.81) −0.026 (0.16)
 Interior −0.015 (0.24) 0.122 (1.23) 0.094 (1.29) −0.077 (0.79)
 Labor −0.235** (2.42) 0.140 (0.96) 0.012 (0.11) −0.079 (0.53)
 National Education 0.015 (0.39) −0.084 (1.40) −0.143*** (2.91) —
 Higher Education −0.073 (0.96) −0.040 (0.036) 0.077 (0.076) —
Category
 B/C Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 A −0.114** (2.47) 0.107 (1.60) 0.110** (2.00) −0.073 (0.91)
Log number of recruits 0.013 (1.24) −0.005 (0.32) 0.021* (1.68) 0.047 (1.32)
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.07
Note: Absolute t-values are in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1% level;
**at the 5% level;
*at the 10% level.
380 Public Administration Review • May | June 2019
on whether or not the candidates are already teachers, we find 
that in both cases, women have a significantly lower probability of 
success than men. More precisely, this probability is 11.3 percentage 
points lower when all candidates are considered and 6.7 percentage 
points lower when we only consider those who are already teachers. 
Therefore, female teachers who succeeded in passing the CAPES 
competitive examination are still less likely to pass written tests of 
Agrégation examination than their male counterparts. To sum up, it 
appears that the significant inequalities of success in the written tests 
are partly based on irrelevant selection criteria.
Furthermore, our results show that in two-stage competitive 
examinations, the disadvantaged (resp. advantaged) candidates 
in the written tests can find themselves at an advantage (resp. at 
a disadvantage) in the oral ones. This is particularly the case for 
women, for whom the evaluation biases in the oral tests tend to 
offset, at least in part, the inequalities observed in the written 
tests. We interpret this compensation as a result of the lifting of 
the candidates’ anonymity, allowing selection boards to make their 
preferences prevail.
Two main arguments favor such interpretation. First, this 
compensation is observed particularly for gender, the most visible 
characteristic in the oral tests, whereas it is not observed for place 
of residence, which cannot be directly identified by selection 
boards. Second, our econometric estimation strategy controls for 
unobservable skills that influence results in both types of tests in the 
same way. However, any difference in design between the written 
and oral tests is likely to explain, at least in part, these evaluation 
biases provided that they lead to valuing differently unobservable 
skills that are unequally distributed between women and men. For 
example, an evaluation bias favoring women may be due to the fact 
that the oral tests require less preparation time than the written ones 
and that women have less average time available than men because 
of their social roles. In this case, the evaluation bias would not 
reflect the fact that the selection board wishes to promote women 
but would come from a female disadvantage that would be less 
prejudicial to success in the oral tests than in the written tests.
To confirm whether gender evaluation biases are really related to 
deliberate selection board behavior, we carried out an additional 
statistical analysis by comparing gender evaluation biases within 
pairs of competitive examinations whose tests designs are very 
similar.15 The results show that the magnitude of gender evaluation 
biases is significantly different for each pair of similar examinations 
analyzed, suggesting that these biases reflect different preferences of 
selection boards as the valuation of skills in the written and oral tests 
is by definition similar.16
Finally, the preferences of selection boards toward gender could 
stem from stereotypes as well as from the desire to promote gender 
diversity within civil service. Additional statistical analyses reveal 
that evaluation biases in favor of women are negatively influenced 
by the share of women among the candidates who took part in all 
the written tests. Furthermore, the fact of including this share as an 
explanatory variable in the meta-regression presented in table 4 does 
not modify the effect of inequalities of success in the written tests 
on evaluation biases. In other words, during the oral tests, selection 
boards seek to improve gender diversity among the hired candidates 
not only by offsetting the inequalities observed in the written tests, 
but also by taking into account the gender disequilibrium among 
the initial pool of candidates.
Such an offsetting behavior could prevail for candidates born 
outside metropolitan France. However, the small number of 
observations we have in our meta-analysis does not allow us to dig 
further into the understanding of the compensation mechanism.
Conclusion
While much of the public administration research advances 
convincing normative arguments for a representative civil service 
workforce, very little attention has been given to investigating the 
capacity of competitive examinations to treat candidates equally 
whatever their sociodemographic characteristics while selecting 
the best candidates. Our research fills this gap by considering 
competitive examinations that have a first stage consisting of 
anonymous written tests and a second one consisting of non-
anonymous oral tests. This specific setting acts as a natural 
experiment for assessing evaluation biases by selection board 
through the comparison of the anonymous and non-anonymous 
stages of the competition.
We use a unique French database that allows us to estimate the 
effects of candidates’ gender, place of birth, and place of residence 
on inequalities of success in written tests and on selection boards’ 
evaluation biases for a large number of competitive sessions. 
While the written tests are the most selective step of competitive 
examinations, they are significantly less successful, all else being 
equal, for candidates born outside metropolitan France, non- 
Parisian candidates, and, to a lesser extent, female candidates. These 
results suggest that adverse impacts can occur during the written 
tests. Consequently, if the French civil service wishes to build a 
diverse, inclusive, and efficient workforce, revising the design of 
the written tests while preserving their ability to select the best 
candidates should be considered.
However, the oral tests lead to evaluation biases aimed at 
compensating for the inequalities related to gender and place of birth 
encountered in written tests. This strategy of selection boards can 
help improve the diversity among the civil servants, but it may also be 
considered positive discrimination, which can stigmatize those who 
benefit from it (Coate and Loury 1993; Foley and Williamson 2019). 
Furthermore, biases in the oral tests operate to offset inequalities in 
the written tests at the group level only. It does not correct the fact 
that individuals unfairly excluded because of written tests adverse 
impacts have been denied opportunity to prove their true ability.
The overall negative effect size for evaluation biases concerning ZUS 
resident candidates, which is independent of inequalities of success 
in written tests, should be investigated further, as it could be related 
to a discriminating behavior of selection boards toward candidates 
from more deprived areas.
Finally, to better guide the state in its revision of competitive 
examinations, further research is necessary to determine to what 
extent the nature of written tests is responsible for the inequalities 
of success and how it penalizes some groups of candidates. In this 
context, the use of the grades obtained in the various written tests 
Do Competitive Examinations Promote Diversity in Civil Service? 381
could highlight which specific subjects or types of test explain the 
observed inequalities.
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Notes
1. Article 6 lays down the principle according to which “all citizens . . . are also 
eligible for all dignities, places and public positions, according to their ability, 
and without distinction other than that of their virtues and talents.”
2. The ministries considered are Agriculture; Economy; Foreign Affairs; Higher 
Education, Research, and Innovation; Interior; Labor; and National Education.
3. The École Normale Supérieure prepares students for high-level teaching and 
academic careers.
4. For example, in many French competitive examinations, a report summarizing 
the profile of the average successful candidate in the written tests scores is 
available for oral examiners.
5. In June 2015, the prime minister entrusted Yannick L’Horty with a mission to 
assess the risk of discrimination in access to public employment (L’Horty 2016). 
We were able to access these data as part of that mission.
6. The external civil service competitive examinations are grouped into three 
hierarchical categories (A, B, and C) based on minimum qualification 
requirements.
7. When only a small number of candidates engaged in a competitive session, we 
group successive sessions as if they formed a single session to obtain estimates 
that are more statistically reliable.
8. A sensitive urban zone (ZUS) is a deprived area defined by the authorities to be a 
high-priority target for city policy, taking into consideration the housing, 
employment, and education problems of its residents.
9. Metropolitan France is the European territory of France. Hence, candidates born 
outside metropolitan France were born either in French overseas departments 
and territories or in another country.
10. The poverty rate is the share of households whose income falls below 60 percent 
of the median household income of the total population.
11. A young person is from a given geographic area if both parents were born in that 
area.
12. In the Ministries of National Education and Higher Education, Research, and 
Innovation, we used first names to identify the gender of candidates, which 
implies that it remains unknown for candidates with gender-neutral first names. 
We control for this lack of information about gender using a dummy variable in 
our regressions.
13. Our study deals with external competitive examinations, but civil servants are 
allowed to take part in these.
14. The numbers of observations in tables 2 and 3 for gender and place of residence 
are somewhat smaller than in table 1. This is because in some competitive 
sessions, the number of candidates for a given criterion was too small to estimate 
the effect.
15. We considered three pairs of competitive examinations. The first pair 
corresponds to the two police officer competitive examinations of the Ministry 
of Interior, which are distinguished only by their place of assignment. The 
second pair consists of competitive examinations for the recruitment of 
secondary school teachers in physics and chemistry. Finally, within the Ministry 
of Economy, we distinguished a third pair of examinations for the recruitment of 
public finance inspectors (general and operating system programmers). For these 
last two pairs, the design of the tests is not exactly identical but very similar.
16. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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